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ABSTRACT
Despite thousands of gun deaths annually, the United
States has failed to reach consensus on any means of
addressing the public health crisis that is gun violence. The
issue has become politically polarized, constitutionalized,
and an object of pessimism and despair. We propose a
regulatory system in which gun manufacturers would be
strictly liable to a federal fund for deaths caused by their
guns, paired with a subsidy that will serve to ensure the
availability of guns sufficient to meet the rights the Supreme
Court has found in the Second Amendment. While strict
liability of this kind can indeed serve its traditional purposes
of spreading costs and incentivizing better designs and
processes, our primary goal is to alter the political economy
around the issue of gun violence more generally. If
manufacturers bear an increasing share of the costs created
by their products, they will endeavor not only to produce
products and advertise them in ways likely to reduce those
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†† J.D., Class of 2020, University of Georgia School of Law. The authors wish to
extend special thanks to the editors of this volume of the Buffalo Law Review,
both for their decency during the submissions process and for their excellent
editing work.
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costs but also to advocate for regulations that may do the
same. While our proposal may not depolarize the issue
entirely, it at least attempts to focus the minds and
experience of those who know guns best on effective means
of reducing guns’ social costs.
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INTRODUCTION1
Guns are used to kill about 40,000 Americans each year.
They are instruments of suicide, of domestic and workplace
rage, of robbery, and of spectacular acts of domestic
terrorism. This “American carnage,” as the President put it
on the occasion of his inauguration,2 can indeed stop. While
it is unrealistic, in a country of over 300 million people, to
believe that we can eliminate all interpersonal violence, it is
equally absurd to insist that mass shootings and thousands
of gun suicides are as inseparable from our landscape as
oxygen.3
The gun violence problem is not one of human nature but
of social organization. The minds and experience that could
best be directed to reducing gun deaths are instead
consumed with fending off any and all gun regulation.4 This
dynamic has caused extensive damage not only to victims of
violence but also to our body politic.5 Indeed, the gun debate
1. This essay elaborates on an idea that Joe Miller and one of the authors,
Christian Turner, explored on an episode of Oral Argument, that Christian
subsequently blogged. See generally Tug of War, ORAL ARGUMENT (June 14, 2016),
https://oralargument.org/101; Christian Turner, Overcoming Gun Violence,
HYDRATEXT (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.hydratext.com/blog/2018/2/16/overcom
ing-gun-violence.
2. See Walter Shapiro, Trump Promised to End “American Carnage.” He Has
Woefully Failed, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 4, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2019/aug/04/trump-promised-end-american-carnage-dayton-elpaso.
3. The Onion has, characteristically, best captured the collective shrug that
follows each mass shooting. See generally ‘No Way to Prevent This,’ Says Only
Nation Where This Regularly Happens, THE ONION (Feb. 14, 2018, 5:32 PM),
https://www.theonion.com/no-way-to-prevent-this-says-only-nation-where-thisr-1823016659.
4. See, e.g., Skye Gould & Brennan Weiss, 5 charts that show how powerful
the NRA is, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 20, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://www.business
insider.com/nra-power-lobbying-statistics-gun-control-2017-10 (noting that, for
example, the NRA “remains one of the most powerful gun rights lobbies in the
United States”).
5. See Victor Agbafe, The Vast Majority of Americans Support Universal
Background Checks. Why Doesn’t Congress?, HARV. KENNEDY SCH.,
https://iop.harvard.edu/get-involved/harvard-political-review/vast-majority-
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has become so caricatured and, at the same time, so stagnant
that it has fostered in too many the insidious belief that our
greatest problems are beyond our ability even to address.6
From it has grown a cynicism that politics can never be
responsive to social problems. The gun debate is a cancer
that has spread to other vital issues. The critical step toward
progress is to promote a shared store of facts and a shared
effort to minimizing social harm.
We propose a first step that centers directly on the
political problem. It is not a list of guns to ban or background
checks to be performed. Before all else, we must begin rowing
in the same direction, and there is a way to accomplish this
critical first step: liability. We do not mean liberalizing
ordinary private liability, with the attendant lawsuits,
discovery, and punitive damage awards. Rather, we propose
an unambiguously required and automatic payment by a gun
manufacturer to a special fund after one of its guns causes a
death. In particular, subject to some details discussed infra,7
for each person killed by a gun, the gun’s manufacturer
would pay $6 million to a federal fund administered by the
Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”).8
Calling for liability rules in response to social harms may
hardly seem novel or sufficient.9 This reform, though, would
americans-support-universal-background-checks (last visited Jan. 11, 2020)
(discussing congressional inaction on universal background checks and the
influence of the NRA).
6. See Julia Biswas, Here’s Why America Can’t Solve Its Gun Problem,
MEDIUM (Aug. 15, 2019), https://medium.com/p/3f13c2d88f95/responses/show
(“And that right there is the problem. If twenty dead children aren’t going to
motivate America to fix its gun policies, then it doesn’t matter how many more
shootings happen . . . .”).
7. See infra Part III (discussing payment and lower bounding to the fund).
8. The rationale for this figure and other design elements is discussed in
Section III.C.1., infra. The upshot is that it is obviously a lower bound on the
social costs imposed by gun sales but is, at the same time, sufficiently
incentivizing to accomplish the goal of reducing gun violence.
9. Making “harm causers” bear the costs of their harm has, in one form or
another, been a consistent aim in tort and criminal law. See, e.g., Stephen R.
Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 465 (1992)
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not be the end of our effort to stem gun violence, but a
necessary beginning that would unlock further rational
policymaking. If a substantial portion of the costs of gun
violence fell on gun manufacturers, two things would follow.
First, and more conventionally, manufacturers’ cost-benefit
calculations would drive them to manufacture guns less
likely to cause deaths that would lead to payment obligations
and to increase prices on riskier guns. But we do not advance
this proposal as a means to achieve some sort of law and
economics ideal of an “efficient” amount of violence. Rather,
the second and more important effect would be a political
economic one, turning gun manufacturers from the fiercest
opponents of sensible gun policies into advocates for effective
regulations concerning background checks, gun attachments
and ammunition, retail sales, and other potentially violencereducing targets.
There is a bit more to our proposal than this, though.
Billing the gun industry for even a modest portion of the
social harms it creates would almost surely bankrupt it
entirely. A Pigouvian tax would be, as things now stand, a
death sentence. Even with the discounting we will propose,
the total liability at current levels of gun violence would
amount to well over $200 billion on an industry whose
revenues are less than $20 billion.10 It is doubtful gun
(noting “Pigou’s thesis that the economically appropriate way to deal with an
externality is to place the cost, through governmental action of some sort, on the
party who caused it” (citing Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J. L. &
ECON. 1 (1960)).
10. See Katina Hristova, What is the Financial Impact Of Gun Violence &
Mass Shooting In The US?, FIN. MONTHLY (Oct. 31, 2017) (“[T]he annual cost of
fatal and non-fatal gun violence to the US was $229 billion . . . .”); Guns &
Ammunition Manufacturing Industry in the US—Market Research Report,
IBISWORLD (July 2019), https://www.ibisworld.com/united-states/marketresearch-reports/guns-ammunition-manufacturing-industry/ (noting that the
gun and ammo manufacturing had total revenues of $17 billion as of July 2019).
The revenue figure here, less than $20 billion and probably around $17 billion,
represents all U.S. gun manufacturing revenues, including exports and sales to
law enforcement and the military, and thus overestimates the revenue
attributable to domestic, private sales. Gun imports have generally amounted to
fewer than 5,000,000 per year, roughly half of the number annually
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manufacturers could raise prices and alter designs and sales
to achieve a reduction in liability sufficient to survive in the
short term.11
The obvious and normal response to this concern is that
imposing liability only reveals a basic economic truth that
has existed all along: The industry is not worth its costs. If
its customers would refuse to pay prices sufficient to cover
all the costs of manufacture, including the cost of violent
deaths, then the market in its aggregate voice is telling us
not to manufacture guns. One of us favors listening to this
voice, but we live in a country in which many do not. Gunrights activists identify with an interpretation of the Second
Amendment they strongly believe requires private gun
availability in fact—not just in theory.
This, then, is the second part of our proposal: a Gun
Subsidy. The CDC would discount the base, per-death
liability payment following a gun death at a rate calculated
at regular intervals to permit the continuing manufacture of
weapons adequate for self-defense within the meaning of
District of Columbia v. Heller,12 while continuing to apply
adequate pressure on manufacturers to reduce gun
mortality. The amount of this discount is the cost of a gun
that the public will bear as a whole and should be explicitly
accounted for as a subsidy. It represents the portion of our
manufactured in the U.S., exclusive of exports. We will look a little more closely
at these figures, infra, but the point here is that there is not nearly enough
domestic revenue to cover even an obvious underestimate of guns’ social cost.
This remains true if one considers not only revenue but total positive economic
impact, which may be around $52 billion. See generally Firearms in the U.S.statistics and facts, STATISTA (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.statista.com/topics
/1287/firearms-in-the-us/.
11. Indeed, gun manufacturers are already struggling, having experienced a
slump in sales following the election of President Trump and a concomitant drop
in anxiety over potential gun regulations or confiscation. See Daniel Trotta, U.S.
Gun Sales Down 6.1 Percent in 2018, Extending ‘Trump Slump’, REUTERS (Jan.
29, 2019, 6:29 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-guns-sales/u-s-gunsales-down-6-1-percent-in-2018-extending-trump-slump-idUSKCN1PN346.
12. 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment confers a
personal right to possess weapons in the home for the purpose of self-defense).
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collective valuation of the availability of the Heller right that
is not reflected in individual acquisitive preferences and,
thus, in market pricing.
The combined effect of these provisions, manufacturers’
strict liability to a fund and the Gun Subsidy, is to make at
least somewhat explicit what is now entirely implicit and, in
fact, invisible in its budgetary implications.13 Guns cause
pain and death even as they bring pleasure to those who
enjoy them. Our nation now counts that pain and death as
no cost at all when collectively deciding through the market
how many and what kinds of guns to manufacture and to
whom to distribute them. Just as a gun cannot be made
without acquiring and charging for metal and labor, so too
its manufacture and sale cannot be severed from the deaths
it will cause or from the collective enjoyment of the
constitutional right its availability has been deemed to
protect. And yet neither of these latter two values is priced,
considered, or widely known.
Our primary purpose in this Article is to highlight that
a diagnosis of the political problem of gun regulation points
the way to a political solution. We give such a solution and
outline a possibility for its practical implementation. In the
first Part, we describe the mechanics of fund liability. In the
second, we summarize its main justifications, adverting to
standard tort theory (and the additional benefits of this
proposal over private tort suits) and then to liability’s more
important political-economy consequences. In the third Part,
we discuss some details of a possible implementation.

13. See Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 22 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The
politically attractive feature of regulation is not that it permits wealth transfers
to be achieved that could not be achieved otherwise; but rather that it permits
them to be achieved ‘off budget,’ with relative invisibility and thus relative
immunity from normal democratic processes.”). The same might be said for nonregulation, itself a regulatory choice assigning costs.
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THE PROPOSAL

Guns are the means by which almost 40,000 Americans
die each year. Forty thousand is a useful number as a
yardstick of risk in the United States. It is roughly the
number of people who die annually in car accidents. It is a
little less than the number of people who died from opioid
overdoses in 2016. It is about the number of suicides. It is a
little more than the total number of all pre-natal and postnatal infant deaths. It is roughly a quarter of all deaths from
all accidents. And it is between one and two percent of all
deaths. These figures are approximate, but “40,000 deaths”
seems to mark the cost of one social problem after another.14
It is an understatement that Americans have widely
varying intuitions and convictions about the costs and
benefits of gun ownership. The best evidence concerning the
actual costs and benefits of keeping guns in one’s home
indicates that it is, all things considered, somewhat risky.15
That said, we all do many risky things throughout our lives,
and if the worst risk guns imposed was a heightened risk of
suicide and accidental death,16 then maybe gun ownership
would fall in the same category as smoking or motorcycle
riding: things most people believe adults should be able to do
if their eyes are open to the dangers.
But guns impose enormous costs that are not born
entirely by gun owners and not at all by gun manufacturers.
These costs are measured in medical bills, death, and grief.
The one thing everyone can agree on is that this level of
14. See Sherry L. Murphy et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2015, DEP’T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERV., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CDC DIV. OF VITAL
STAT. (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr66/nvsr66_06.pdf
(“In 2015, 36,252 persons died from injury by firearms in the United States.”).
15. See generally Suicide, HARV. INJURY CONTROL RESEARCH CTR.,
https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hicrc/firearms-research/gun-ownership-and-use/
(last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (collecting sources demonstrating the risks and dangers
of gun ownership).
16. Id. (noting that several studies indicate that there is a strong association
with the number of guns, suicides, and accidental deaths).
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suffering is horrible and that it would be good to eliminate it.
No legitimate voice in the gun debate welcomes gun deaths.
What we tend not to agree on is how to measure the
benefits of gun ownership. One of us (Christian) would, if he
had no humility about the importance others might attach to
guns, ban guns entirely and even confiscate the existing
stock without compensation. He believes guns are not even
close to being worth their cost, that they make safetyobsessed owners much less safe, and that the fantasies they
engender of fending off either bad guys or (even more
ludicrously) a tyrannical government are unhealthy. But he
does understand that guns have important and unknown-tohim meanings for others, like Justin, and that more careful
analysis of the “how maintained” and “what kinds of guns”
questions could, possibly, point toward an acceptable regime
of private gun ownership.
It is precisely in such a circumstance—large but
uncontroversial costs offset by controversial and
pluralistically understood benefits—that a tax of some form
can decentralize the production and distribution questions in
a manner less injurious to the public good. Asymmetrical
uncertainty is not an obstacle to good public policy. We need
not know “the one right solution” to optimal gun production
and distribution to make a boring suggestion that will help
us all: If gun manufacturers had to pay the costs of gun
deaths, then many good things would begin to happen.
Our proposal:
Automatic Liability to the Gun Safety Fund: Gun
manufacturers are required to pay $6 million for a death caused by
a firearm they manufacture.17 The manufacturer would be liable
not to a private party but to a federal fund, which could be called
the Gun Safety Fund and be administered by the Centers for

17. This is complicated to some extent by our suggested implementation
discussed below. Most notably, we would not find liability at all for deaths
resulting from self-defense and would discount the amount owed for a death by
suicide to charge, in the aggregate, only for the excess suicides caused by guns.
See infra Section III.C.3.
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Disease Control and Prevention. Liability would be automatic and
avoided only when the death is the result of a legitimate use of force
by a law enforcement officer or an exercise of justifiable selfdefense. Such defenses to payment could be raised in an
administrative hearing before the CDC (and appealed from there as
any other administrative adjudication). There would be no private
plaintiffs’ attorneys, no fights over punitive or compensatory
damages, comparative negligence, discovery, or any of the usual but
often necessary sources of inefficiency in litigation.18 The form of
liability would be closer to a death tax than a tort judgment.
The Gun Subsidy: The CDC will be charged initially with
determining an amount that will be refunded to a liable
manufacturer following payment. That amount will be what the
CDC finds is necessary to preserve the practical availability of guns
for those purposes identified in Heller as protected by the Second
Amendment, erring on the side of over-subsidizing. Every two
years, the amount of the subsidy paid as a refund will be reduced
by 2%, unless the CDC determines there is a reasonable likelihood
that production would fall below the Heller baseline described
above. The upshot is that after a century the subsidy would be a
little more than one-third of its initial amount.19 The CDC will
annually publish and publicize statistics gathered on gun violence
and highlight the amount of the year’s Gun Subsidy.

The details, of course, matter. For example, we would
make the findings of responsible medical examiners
concerning which gun caused a death (and whether it did)
conclusive for these purposes, and it would be a federal
offense for any agent of a firearms manufacturer to attempt
to influence such an examiner. We would also discount the
payment owed for gun suicides, not because such lives are
less valuable but to require payment only for the excess
number of successful suicides caused by guns. That is, the

18. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16
J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 189–90 (1987) (detailing agency issues in settlement, for
example, when multiple people share in a claim); William Vickrey, Automobile
Accidents, Tort Law, Externalities, and Insurance: An Economist’s Critique, 33
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 464, 469–70 (1968) (discussing how most economists
agreed with Guido Calabresi that the tort system, especially in accident cases,
was an inefficient system of accident regulation).
19. The amount of the subsidy will always be initially calculated in 2020
dollars and then converted, with the indexing to be performed by the agency
using acceptable methods.
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payment would reflect the number of suicides over and above
what that number would have been if only alternative
methods of suicide were available.20 We would also require a
quadrennial determination by the CDC of this figure through
the normal informal rulemaking process. These and other
details are covered more fully in Part III.
Fund liability is not intended to be a perfect Pigouvian
tax. At each point, we have chosen to calculate the liability
using lower bounds. The total amount of the payments we
propose would be dramatically less, in aggregate, than the
cost of actual harms flowing from the use of guns. For one, it
would only require payment for deaths and not for injuries,
which number more than twice the number of deaths.21 And
$6 million is less than what most agencies identify as the
monetary value of a human life for cost-benefit analysis
purposes.22 But perfect internalization of externalities, a
theoretically dubious proposition for reasons well-trodden by
Ronald Coase,23 is not the point. Any significant tax on
manufacturers that scales with death will lead
manufacturers to take some steps to reduce the tax, both in
production and in politics. It is the direction of social effort
that concerns us most, not accounting.
Even this heavily discounted cost internalization,
however, is likely too large for the gun industry to absorb.
20. See, e.g., Matthew Miller et al., Firearms and Suicide in the United States,
GUN VIOLENCE & MENTAL ILLNESS 31, 31–43 (explaining that more suicides
happen in American homes with firearms and that, absent a firearm, most
suicide victims would not seek an alternative method of suicide).
21. The CDC estimates that over 100,000 Americans are shot and injured
each year—compared to 36,000 deaths. See Web-based Injury Statistics Query
and Reporting System (WISQARS) “Nonfatal Injury Reports,” CTR. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars (last visited Nov. 3,
2019). The CDC warns that its estimates of nonfatal firearm injuries may be
“unstable and potentially unreliable.” To increase reliability of the data, a fiveyear average of the most recently available data (2013 to 2017) was used.
22. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
23. See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960) (discussing the conceptual problems of internalizing so-called
externalities).
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Gun manufacturers’ total revenues from private sales in the
United States is probably around $17 billion and almost
surely less than $20 billion, with profits of just a billion or
two.24 Even if we assume a total discounting of suicide deaths
and that payments would be owed for only half of other
deaths, say 6,000 of the 40,000-or-so gun deaths, the
aggregate payment would be about $36 billion. Despite lowballing the harms again and again, the industry would not
come close to being able to cover the costs it imposes. The
Gun Subsidy must, therefore, initially be massive if the
industry is to be kept afloat.25 Reducing the subsidy over
time, with some degree of certainty, will enable the industry
to plan, redesign, alter marketing, work with state
governments to implement better laws, and perhaps even to
participate in gun buy-backs. The responses are difficult to
predict as non-experts, and that is our very point.

24. In 2016, there were about 11.5 million guns manufactured in the United
States, excluding those manufactured for the U.S. military, and about 5.1 million
guns imported, with only a few hundred thousand exported. Firearm Commerce
in the United States, Annual Statistical Update 2018, ATF, https://www.
atf.gov/resource-center/docs/undefined/firearmscommercestatisticalupdate2018
5087-24-18pdf/download. The average selling price for guns is less than $1,000.
And so, estimates of total revenues of less than $17 billion and profits around
$1.5 billion seem reasonable. See Ben Popken, America’s Gun Business, By the
Numbers, NBC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2015, 9:28 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
storyline/san-bernardino-shooting/americas-gun-business-numbers-n437566.
25. Indeed, it should not be glossed over that the hidden subsidy we pay now
is massive. What we are proposing here is to acknowledge it.
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II. BENEFITS
A. Standard Tort Theory
First, the obvious: If manufacturers must pay for deaths
caused by guns they manufacture, at least some of the costs
of gun violence, accidents, and excess suicides would be
spread over all gun owners rather than born primarily by
victims and secondarily by society at large.26 That seems
both fair and an appealing political argument in favor of
shifting costs.27 Why should victims pay for the downsides of
gun ownership? Why should we subsidize gun manufacturers
who stand alone in reaping all the profits of their activities
but not a very substantial portion of their costs? Higher retail
gun prices would result from the automatic liability regime,
and these higher prices would reduce the rate of gun
ownership, but only rationally so. If you can manufacture a
safer gun, it will incur less liability and so can be priced more
cheaply. People will therefore be more likely to purchase
safer guns.
All this is a traditional sort of argument for strict
liability. Put the costs of injury on the entity that could most
cheaply avoid or minimize them and you wind up with a
system that more optimally balances costs and benefits.28
And so, on this ground, we might be inclined to repeal the

26. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 312 (1970) (discussing a system that “could begin by allocating accident
costs to those categories that can avoid accidents most cheaply but are sufficiently
broad to spread the costs adequately”).
27. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring) (“Those who suffer injury from defective products are
unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time
or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a
needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and
distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.”). Traynor’s opinion is
famous for both its efficiency and distributive justice arguments for strict liability
for injuries arising from manufacturing defects in consumer products.
28. See CALABRESI, supra note 26, at 162 (explaining how costs and benefits
balance in the context of dock owners and shipowners with respect to accidents).
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Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, which, with
some exceptions, shields gun manufacturers and dealers
from liability for injuries arising from crimes committed with
their products.29
We do not favor that and believe that the automatic CDC
payment should be the exclusive form of liability. For one,
our proposal would engender more stable expectations on the
part of manufacturers, swifter imposition of costs, and
greatly reduced administrative costs. All this provides a
surer and steadier signal to manufacturers that could
prompt manufacturing changes and continued engagement
in formulating and encouraging cost-reducing public policies.
Moreover, the fund could be used for more general antiviolence purposes and for compensation of victims and their
families in a more finely tuned manner than would otherwise
be possible in antagonistic private litigation pitting
manufacturers against victims, especially given the
vicissitudes of private litigation.
This novel form of liability is not designed to achieve the
most economically efficient number of gun deaths, as if there
were such a thing. We both believe the right number of such
deaths is zero. But while there are many possible solutions
to reducing gun violence, our nation has thus far eschewed
nearly all of them. For this reason, we would settle for less
than optimal. Our problem is getting anything at all done in
the face of powerful incentives to do nothing.30 To do so, we
could try to get the gun manufacturers to think differently
about their social role. And that, rather than mere costconsciousness in its role as vendor, is the most important
virtue of this proposal.

29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2012).
30. In the last two years the NRA, for example, spent “a record $9.6 million
lobbying lawmakers and federal agencies over the last two years . . . up from $5.9
million the previous two years.” Bill Allison, NRA Spent Record Amount Lobbying
Congress, With Little to Show, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 5, 2019, 4:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-05/nra-spent-record-amountlobbying-congress-with-little-to-show.
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B. Political Economy
The payment regime’s most important effect, and one
that we hope would have positive spillover effects on other
political issues,31 would be to make gun manufacturers
willing participants in social efforts to stem gun violence.
When you are the one who will pay the cost of a bad outcome,
you become directly concerned with preventing that outcome.
Upton Sinclair warned that “[i]t is difficult to get a man to
understand something, when his salary depends on his not
understanding it.”32 Just as surely, though, you cannot make
people ignore a problem when their salaries depends on
apprehending it. Liability gives us a chance to flip the
prevailing political script and to get those who know these
weapons best to think hard about how to stop their being
used to kill in large numbers.
Yes, manufacturers would seek to manufacture safer
guns and to advertise and market in ways that reduce the
risk of death. These are the vendor-specific effects of a tax.
But they would also be far more likely to advocate for state
and federal legal restrictions on gun ownership and sales,
background checks, enforcement, and public health research.
For the riskiest guns, manufacturers might support or even
engage in gun buy-backs. In sum, they would not only take
the private steps to reduce costs that are within their control
but also public steps to advocate for cost reduction that only
legislators and regulators can provide.
Because it is uncertain what the most effective mix of
regulation and prohibition might be, especially for those of
us unfamiliar with guns and their manufacture, we should

31. See, e.g., Harry Enten, The U.S. Has Never Been So Polarized on Guns,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 4, 2017 6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/
the-u-s-has-never-been-so-polarized-on-guns/ (explaining the recent polarization
on gun control in relation to other political issues like the border wall, health
care, and global warming).
32. UPTON SINCLAIR, I, CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR: AND HOW I GOT LICKED 109
(1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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align incentives so that those who do have such expertise
reveal it. To be clear, we should not tax gun deaths because
we think that the amount of the tax is what a life is worth.
Nor is the purpose of a payment requirement to suggest that
a manufacturer’s moral duty to the killed and maimed has
been discharged with a financial transaction. Rather, the
goal is to alter the organization of social forces in such a way
that we begin to strive for the same goal, even if we continue
to disagree about means. By putting some of the costs of guns
back on their manufacturers, there might even arise a new
National Rifle Association (“NRA”) that is committed to
researching and identifying effective regulations. After all,
manufacturer lobbies lobby for manufacturers.
There is, we believe, potentially a further benefit of this
proposal, though it is harder to quantify. While many of us
may not be able to imagine making a living manufacturing
assault rifles, people are different. We cannot ignore that
people do in fact make these weapons for reasons that some
of us may not completely understand and that they do in fact
pay nothing for the deaths that result from their work.
Internalizing these costs could change the way gunmakers
understand their work, perhaps, helping them break free of
the ideologically pure and oppositional politics that have
corrupted their relationship to the community. Forcing a
change in conceiving of the social effects of one’s business
from “not my concern” to “my job is making sure that never
happens” is a laudable goal on virtue ethics grounds.33 And
while forcing payment will in the first instance change
incentives, it just might, in the second instance, change
minds and attitudes.

33. And this is a bipartisan goal at that. See BRADY UNITED AGAINST GUN
VIOLENCE, https://www.bradyunited.org (last visited Nov. 3, 2019) (explaining
how initiatives such as the Prevent Family Fire Act of 2019 is a step toward
curbing gun violence despite the common rhetoric that “it can’t be done”).
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III. IMPLEMENTATION
The core of our proposal is modest cost-shifting of gun
deaths to the gun economy, with explicit and publicized
subsidies to keep the private gun industry afloat but visibly
accountable. Any implementation that accomplishes these
twin aims in rough form would be a welcome corrective to the
extreme but silent subsidization of private guns that now
prevails. In this Part, we lay out one possible pathway for
such a regime, putting the CDC in the leading role. First,
because our approach depends on identifying the
manufacturer of a gun that has caused a death, we discuss
the practicability of manufacturer identification, steps to
take in the face of uncertainty, and incentives that would
help to reduce that uncertainty. Second, we suggest a
mechanism for apportioning liability among manufacturers
when it remains uncertain which gun caused a death. Here,
we recommend liability be apportioned among all guns in the
class of potentially responsible guns according to their
proportions of responsibility for those deaths for which
responsible guns have been identified. In other words, we
suggest proceeding as though gun identifications that are
made are representative of those that have not. Third, we
outline the administrative procedure for imposing the
liability and setting the important rates used in assessing
liability and subsidies.
A. Gunmaker Identification
It is one thing to talk theoretically about requiring gun
manufacturers to internalize costs, but it is a more complex
and nuanced matter to evaluate the feasibility of identifying
whose products are used to commit homicides and suicides.
Identifying responsible manufacturers under existing laws
and regulations will be more difficult than it should be,
thanks in no small part to the efforts of the NRA.34 But states
34. See Ali Watkins, How the N.R.A. Keeps Federal Gun Regulators in Check,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/22/us/politics
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like New Jersey, California, and Maryland have already
demonstrated that information sharing between gun
manufacturers and agencies is workable and sufficient to
identify the manufacturer of guns used in homicides. We
discuss two hurdles in this regard: (1) the capacity to match
crime scene evidence to a gun’s manufacturer and (2) the
mechanism by which such evidence will be made available to
the federal program.
1. Identification by Fingerprinting and Class
Characteristics.
It is sometimes unknown what manufacture of gun was
used to cause a death. While almost never an issue in
suicides and accidents, homicide guns are not regularly
recovered.35 And so the type of gun used must be inferred
from other evidence. We propose a procedure to deal with
these uncertainties, pursuing fairness, efficiency, and the
promotion of better tools to make the most of crime scene
evidence.
First, and most importantly, our proposal does not
depend on matching a particular gun or identifying a
particular owner or sale. It does not even depend on
identifying a make of gun. Rather, we only need to learn from
recovered bullets, casings, or other evidence what
manufacturer was involved. When a gun is not recovered, the
gun manufacturer may be identified by matching the
evidence a shooting leaves behind, in, for example, bullet
fragments and casings, either to a known, particular gun or
to a class of potentially responsible guns. While the first of
these possibilities, identifying a particular gun, raises alarm
bells for some gun enthusiasts, the latter, identifying generic
traits, is completely adequate for our purposes.
/trump-atf-nra.html (explaining NRA lobbying efforts “to enact restrictions on
how [the ATF] spends money to curtail its ability to regulate firearms and track
gun crimes”).
35. Such cases are often called “no-gun crime scenes.” See infra note 52 and
accompanying text; see also infra note 40 and accompanying text.
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a. Fingerprinting
There are occasions when the easiest way to identify a
missing crime scene gun is to match the residual evidence to
a particular, known crime gun. The Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) manages the
National Integrated Ballistic Information Network
(“NIBIN”).36 NIBIN uses “equipment [that] allows firearms
examiners and technicians to acquire analog images of the
markings made by a firearm on bullets and cartridge
casings.”37 The ATF and some 196 participating agencies
continue to grow this database by collecting images of bullets
and firearms recovered from criminal investigations. In turn,
this helps investigators link recovered firearms to other
crimes committed with the particular gun in question.38
NIBIN’s error rate is acceptably low for our purposes, at
about 1%.39
The availability of NIBIN will help to identify some guns.
But it will only identify a gun from crime scene evidence after
that gun has been otherwise recovered. In the case of
homicides, the gun recovery rate is probably less than a third
and varies widely between jurisdictions.40 Moreover, the

36. ATF derives authority to establish NIBIN due to the enabling act, 28
C.F.R. § 0.130 (2015). Additionally, ATF derives authority to engage in activities
related to the investigation and suppression of violent crime via 18 U.S.C. § 921
(2004).
37. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., BUREAU OF ALCOHOL,
TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES’ NAT’L INTEGRATED BALLISTIC INFO. NETWORK
PROGRAM, AUDIT REPORT 05-30, at i (2005), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/ATF/
a0530/final.pdf [hereinafter “ATF AUDIT REPORT”].
38. Id. at v–vi.
39. Nancy Ritter, The Science Behind Firearm and Tool Mark Examination,
NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J., no. 274, Dec. 2014, at 21 (“NIJ’s most recent findings,
released in February 2014, established an error rate of less than 1.2
percent . . . .”).
40. In 2016, for example, Mississippi reported 587 firearm deaths, but only
recovered 97 of the guns used within the following year. See Stats of the State of
Mississippi, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/
states/mississippi/mississippi.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2019); Robin Fitzgerald,
Over 4,000 Guns Were Recovered in Mississippi Last Year. Half Were Used in
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NIBIN system suffers from delays in processing ballistics
evidence.41
But fingerprinting guns on the “back-end,” after they
have been recovered, is not the only possibility. There have
also been some efforts at “front-end” fingerprinting,
designing guns to leave unique marks on the evidence they
leave
behind.
For
example,
intentional
firearm
microstamping (“IFM”) is a “technology that leverages a
laser-based micromachining process to form optimally
located, microscopic ‘intentional structures and marks’ on
components within a firearm. Thus when the firearm is fired,
these IFM structures transfer an identifying tracking code
onto the expended cartridge that is ejected from the
firearm.”42 So long as a bullet can be recovered from a crime
scene, an IFM gun can be identified.
Currently, California is the only state that mandates
IFM.43 Unsurprisingly, its law is under attack by gun
lobbyists.44 The objections to front-end fingerprinting guns
parallel those raised against gun registries and other efforts
to maintain data on who owns which guns.45

Crimes, SUNHERALD (Dec. 3, 2017), https://www.sunherald.com/news/local/
crime/article187747813.html. Between 2011–2012 Louisiana recovered 29.7% of
firearms used in homicides. Megan E. Collins et al., A Comparative Analysis of
Crime Guns, 3 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. OF SOC. SCI. 96, 106 (2017).
41. Nancy Ritter, Study Identifies Ways to Improve ATF Ballistic Evidence
Program, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J., no. 274, Dec. 2014, at 15.
42. See Orest P. Ohar & Todd E. Lizotte, Extracting Ballistic Forensic
Intelligence: Microstamped Firearms Deliver Data for Illegal Firearm Traffic
Mapping – Technology, PROC. OF SPIE, Aug. 28, 2009, at 1.
43. CAL. PENAL CODE § 31910(b)(7) (West 2012).
44. See Matthew Harper, It’s Time to End ‘Microstamp’ Requirement for
Handguns, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2018, 12:15 PM), https://www.latimes.com/
socal/daily-pilot/opinion/tn-dpt-me-harper-commentary-20180405-story.html
(discussing a bill to overturn California’s microstamping requirement).
45. Common objections to any form of registration include the high cost of
maintaining a registry, that criminals will not register their guns so why should
law abiding citizens do so, and the alleged failed registries in countries like
Canada and New Zealand. Charles C.W. Cooke, Against Gun Registration, NAT’L
REV. (Feb. 26, 2013, 9:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2013/02/against-

1138

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

b. Generic Identification
Our proposal does not require a registry of ownership or
the ability to identify a particular gun as responsible for a
gun death. All that is required is the capability to infer a
gun’s manufacturer from evidence found on the scene.46
There already exist some techniques to identify categories of
potentially responsible guns from bullets and casings. We
believe more is possible here. Indeed, IFM processes show
that it is possible to create individualized fingerprints, and
all we would require is a manufacturer-wide fingerprint.
Some distinguishing characteristics, though, can already be
discerned from evidence created by the existing stock of
guns.
“Class characteristics are measurable features of a
specimen which indicate a restricted group source” and help
scientists determine the type of firearm used (i.e., handgun,
rifle, etc.).47 In short, “[w]hen bullets . . . are fired or ejected
from a firearm, the parts of the firearm that make forcible
contact with them create characteristic tool marks called
‘ballistic signatures.’”48 These “ballistic signatures” can help
gun-registration-charles-c-w-cooke/. Others fear that any registration data will
lead to confiscation and extermination of gun owners. See Jim Eways, QUORA
(Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.quora.com/What-are-the-best-arguments-against-aU-S-national-gun-registry (citing gun control efforts in various countries as the
cause of mass exterminations of people). To be sure, the consensus is that gun
registration is constitutional. See Declan McCullagh, Sorry, Mandatory Gun
Registration Is Constitutional, CBS NEWS (Aug. 21, 2009, 3:14 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/sorry-mandatory-gun-registration-isconstitutional/ (detailing the opinions of constitutional scholars and Supreme
Court opinions that suggest registration is constitutional).
46. We will relax even this requirement, apportioning liability among
potentially responsible manufacturers in the face of residual uncertainty. See
infra Section III.A.1.c.
47. Vincenzo D. Crawford, Class, Individual, & Sub-Class Characteristics of
Firearm & their Constituents, ACADEMIA, https://www.academia.edu/12309195/
Class_Characteristics_Individual_Characteristics_and_SubClass_Characteristics_Of_Firearms_and_their_Constituents (last visited Sept.
29, 2019).
48. John Song et al., Estimating Error Rates for Firearm Evidence
Identifications in Forensic Science, 284 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 15, 15 (2018).
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“exclude a firearm as a source of a recovered . . . bullet.”49
Sub-class characteristics are identifiers “incidental to
manufacture” and can help define the precise gun used in a
homicide.50 For instance, one handgun manufacturer, HiPoint, uniquely includes rifling that spins bullets in a
leftward spiral.51
There exist several systematic methods for identifying
and using class characteristics. The Kennington Matrix
System, developed in the 1950s, categorizes evidence based
on: (1) manufacturer and type of bullet, (2) chamber marks,
(3) extractor mark shape, (4) ejector mark, (5) firing pin
impression, and (6) breech face marks. Its digital
descendants include a variety of databases, including the
General Rifling Characteristic (“GRC”) Database used by the
FBI and the Integrated Ballistics Identification System
(“IBIS”).52 Other research efforts have created user-friendly
decision trees from images of spent cartridge cases that may
narrow the possible makes and models of a missing crime
gun to at most two or three.53
More promising yet is the Congruent Matching Cells
Method (“CMC method”), which uses 3D topographical

49. Id.
50. ROBERT M. THOMPSON, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., FIREARM IDENTIFICATION
(2010).

IN

THE FORENSIC SCIENCE LABORATORY 9

51. United States. v. Walton, No. 1:16-CR-145-2-TWT, 2019 WL 188432 (N.D.
Ga. Jan. 14, 2019) (statement of Michael Powell); see also B. Gil. Horman, HiPoint Firearms .45 ACP Pistol & Carbine, AMERICAN RIFLEMAN (AUG. 21, 2015),
https://www.americanrifleman.org/articles/2015/8/21/hi-point-firearms-45-acppistol-carbine/; COLLABORATIVE TESTING SERVS., INC, FIREARMS EXAMINATION TEST
NO. 16-526 SUMMARY REPORT 14 (2016), https://cts-forensics.com/reports/
3626_Web.pdf.
52. See, e.g., Young Wang, Class Characteristics Classification of Test Fired
Cartridge Cases: A Digital Image Decision Tree Approach to Kennington’s Matrix
for Initial Stages of Criminal Investigation, 6 FORENSIC SCI. & CRIMINAL INVES.,
Nov. 2017, at 1, 2.
53. Id. at 3, 5 (noting that dependent upon the visibility of firing pin drag
marks certain firearms can be mistaken for another, but usually between no more
than two or three).
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images of breech face impressions.54 Reference and
comparison images of these impressions are divided into a
rectangular array of cells and run through an automated
search, which compares each cell for similarities and then
subjects these comparisons to an algorithm.55 Researchers
have noted that “the extremely small false positive error
rates calculated from the [CMC] models suggest the
feasibility of applying the CMC method to a large number of
firearms.”56 Indeed, the Special Programs Office of the
National Institute of Science and Technology is funding
research with a long term goal to enable “ballistic examiners
[to] input either topographies or optical intensity images into
a program that automatically conducts correlations, and
generates objective conclusions (declared match for example)
and error rate estimates.”57
While there is much promise in these new methods, they
all involve what we call “back-end categorizations,” meaning
they are built from distinguishable class characteristics
identified from test firings. Such methods can already
helpfully narrow the category of potentially responsible
manufacturers, and indeed, expanding efforts at class
characterization should be a priority (and one possible use of
the fund).
Front-end efforts, however, could dramatically improve
manufacturer identification. If guns were designed to
imprint markings on bullets and casings that distinguish the
manufacturer, the accuracy of our program would be much
improved. Unlike the unique fingerprints California’s IFM
mandate requires, our purposes would be served by generic
stamps that identify only the gun’s manufacturer. Designing
54. Song, supra note 48, at 16. The breech face is the part of the firearm that
holds a cartridge in the gun’s chamber. When the gun is fired, the cartridge is
forcibly pressed against this part, generally making an impression in the
cartridge.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 29.
57. Id. at 29–30.
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for identification on the front end, as with IFM, would
dramatically improve the ability to identify the make of a
missing crime gun.
c. Manufacturer-Side Incentives and Mandates to
Promote Identification.
The identification problem should be addressed as part
of the Gun Subsidy’s basic design. We have two
recommendations: (1) a specimen approach and (2) a
fingerprinting approach, mirroring the back-end and frontend methods described above.
First, we could mandate or encourage all states to enact
programs formerly employed in New York and Maryland.58
Before repealing their laws due to cost concerns,59 both states
required all manufacturers that shipped or transported
handguns to be sold or rented in the state to be test-fired
prior to sale or transfer. Spent casings were provided to
firearm dealers, and, once the guns were sold, the dealers
would then forward the casings to the state police, which
entered the markings into state databases similar to
NIBIN.60
A version of this model could work nationwide. Unlike
the original state laws, our purpose is manufacturer
identification, not detection of criminal assailants (though
there is no reason our system would prevent identifying the
latter). And the costs of processing the ballistic images could
be covered by the payments made from the manufacturers to
58. See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-131, repealed by Acts 2015, ch. 379,
§ 1, effective Oct. 1, 2015; see also N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-ff (repealed 2012).
59. See Eric Cox, Maryland Scraps Gun ‘Fingerprint’ Database After 15 Failed
Years, BALTIMORE SUN (Nov. 7, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/
maryland/bs-md-bullet-casings-20151107-story.html (citing that the system cost
$2.4 million and resulted in no crimes solved). The cost-benefit calculus of these
programs for our purposes would, obviously, be different. While criminal
detection would be a welcome benefit, the purpose of our program is accurate
identification of responsible manufacturers. And program cost could be met, in
part or whole, by program funds.
60. ATF AUDIT REPORT, supra note 37, at xii–xiii.
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the fund.
Gun manufacturers would test-fire all firearms prior to
shipping them to dealers. Instead of sending the spent casing
to the dealer, they would be sent directly to the ATF. The
ATF—which already employs firearms experts and
technicians—would then record images of the casing into
NIBIN and that data could either be furnished directly, or
made accessible, to the CDC. This requirement would hardly
burden firearm manufacturers. After all, manufacturers
already test-fire their products for quality control purposes.61
This approach also removes some of the burden on the states
to process the initial ballistic images by placing the
responsibility on gun manufacturers and the federal
government.
Second, we could adopt a measure similar to California’s
IFM law. The law would require all guns produced from a
certain date forward to incorporate microstamping
technology. Unlike California’s law, the Gun Subsidy
program requires a stamp specific only to manufacturer, not
stamps unique to each firearm. This would obviate the usual
arguments against specific identifications of gun owners, the
maintenance of registries, and the like.
We propose a valuable inducement for stamping, which
could be offered in lieu of an actual mandate or alongside it:
a limitation on their exposure to liability for deaths due to
pre-IFM guns for which they might otherwise be responsible.
We discuss this limitation, and therefore its effectiveness as
an incentive, below. For now, it should be obvious that the
benefits of microstamping are two-fold, increasing efficiency

61. See GLOCK, https://eu.glock.com/en/explore-glock/advanced-manufactur
ing (last visited Apr. 5, 2019) (“Every single GLOCK pistol is test fired to ensure
CIP conformity as well as flawless function and accuracy out of the box.”); see also
KIMBER, https://www.kimberamerica.com/faq (last visited Apr. 5, 2019) (noting
the caliber of ammunition used in function testing). A quick internet search of
“are guns test-fired at the factory” recovers multiple message boards confirming
that most manufacturers do test-fire at least 1–2 rounds before shipping guns to
dealers.
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and reducing costs.
Microstamping would allow both state and federal
agencies the ability quickly to identify manufacturers
without the limitations of NIBIN and current ballistic
analysis.62 Because each stamp is unique to a particular
manufacturer, identification would become more or less
automatic. While implementing microstamping technology
into the manufacturing process might, at least initially, be
costly,63 these costs are negligible next to the public subsidy
of guns that is now only implicit. And, after all, similar
arguments were made by auto manufacturers when airbags
and seatbelts were mandated, but, luckily, the auto industry
lost those fights.64
2. Reporting from Crime Scenes to the CDC.
The Gun Safety Fund can only be administered if state
and local law enforcement officials provide data from their
investigations. Most law enforcement agencies already
attempt to identify the make and model of guns used in
murders, and of course recover firearms when possible.65
While Printz v. United States established that the federal
62. This is not to say that microstamping is foolproof—it is not—but our
proposal is not designed to identify every firearm, only to identify as many as
possible. See Nick Leghorn, The Truth About Microstamping, THE TRUTH ABOUT
GUNS (Aug. 29, 2011), https://www.thetruthaboutguns.com/2011/08/foghorn/thetruth-about-microstamping/ (observing that microstamps can wear down or be
filed and that it does not work for revolvers because casings aren’t ejected).
63. California’s Microstamping Requirement Bans Sale of Improved Pistols—
Dealers Face Shortage of Handguns Approved for Sale, NRA-ILA (Jan. 23, 2014),
https://www.nraila.org/articles/20140123/californias-microstampingrequirement-bans-sale-of-improved-pistols-dealers-face-shortage-of-handgunsapproved-for-sale (“But while the actual microscopic etching process may itself
be cheap, the real cost of incorporating microstamping into the manufacturing
process is not.”).
64. See Leo C. Wolinsky, Big Lobbies Clash in Fight on Seatbelts: Hearings
Open Today as California Joins Auto Safety Debate, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 19, 1985)
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-02-19-mn-546-story.html (noting
that automakers opposed the seatbelt and airbag mandate for “nearly a decade
as too costly and only marginally effective”).
65. See generally supra Section III.A.1.a.
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government cannot commandeer state officials to administer
a federal regulatory scheme, it did not question federal
incentives to participate by conditioning funds.66 Thus, we
would condition grants from the fund itself, discussed in
Section III.D., infra, on the local law enforcement’s sharing
needed data with the CDC, ATF, and other relevant
agencies.67
Some states have already laid the foundation for just
such a reporting system. New Jersey, in particular, has
undertaken a number of efforts to combat gun violence.68 Of
particular interest to our project is the N.J. GUNStat
Report,69 which aims to “increase public awareness about the
effects of gun violence by providing data to the public on gun
crimes and the source states from which . . . crime guns are
flowing.”70
The GUNStat Report is issued monthly and includes
data on the number of guns recovered by county and city—
listing the type and caliber of gun—among other data.71

66. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). Our proposal is also consistent with National Fed’n
of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), because it lets states choose
whether to participate and does not penalize them with the loss of existing funds
if they choose not to do so. See id. at 585 (“Nothing in our opinion precludes
Congress from offering funds . . . and requiring that States accepting such funds
comply with the conditions on their use. What Congress is not free to do is to
penalize States that choose not to participate in that new program by taking
away their existing Medicaid funding.”).
67. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
68. See Colleen O’Dea, Interactive Map: Where ‘Crime Guns’ Have Been
Recovered
in
New
Jersey,
N.J.
SPOTLIGHT
(July
24,
2019),
https://www.njspotlight.com/stories/19/07/23/state-data-provides-soberingglimpse-of-illegal-guns-in-nj/.
69. See Christian Hetrick, New Jersey Reports Show Most Guns Used in
Crimes Were Purchased in Other States, OBSERVER (May 8, 2018, 5:30 PM),
https://observer.com/2018/05/new-jersey-releases-gun-violence-reports/
(describing the GUNStat Report’s creation by executive order).
70. Governor Murphy Announces Release of GUNStat Report, N.J. ST. POLICE
(May 8, 2018), https://www.njsp.org/news/2018/20180508.shtml (noting that 77%
of guns used in crimes in New Jersey comes from other states).
71. Id.
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These data are collected by local law enforcement officers
and are used by the state and the ATF to “investigate straw
purchasers and bad faith dealers in other states.”72 But the
report goes a step further than other data collection
programs: It names gun manufacturers.73 The purpose of
doing so, and of naming crime guns’ states of origin, is to
“draw attention to the gun crime statistics and ‘name and
shame’ states with lax gun laws”74 and to also “wake up [gun]
manufacturers.”75 This effort is consistent with our purpose
to publicize and concretize costs. Our modest shifting of those
same costs will do much more to change the behavior of
various actors in the gun economy.
We would condition state and local receipt of funds from
gun liability payments on the continuing provision by law
enforcement of information from homicide, suicide, and
accident investigations. The cooperation here would be twofold. First, local officials would be required to send ballistics
information concerning the make of potentially responsible
firearms to the CDC. Second, the CDC would need the
support of state coroners and medical examiners to
participate as witnesses should the gun manufacturers want
to challenge any findings in an administrative hearing, about
which we provide more details in Section III.C.4., infra.76

72. Id.
73. Including names of firearm manufacturers is a recent expansion starting
in 2019. See O’Dea, supra note 68.
74. Hetrick, supra note 69.
75. NJ Gov. Murphy Expanding ‘GUNStat’ Program, Which Tracks Guns
Used in Crimes, CBS N.Y. (Mar. 12, 2019, 12:38 PM), https://newyork.cbslocal.
com/2019/03/12/gunstat-gun-tracking/.
76. Certain states have county, district or parish based medical examiners or
coroner systems. The reporting system would require these states to make these
officials available as witnesses for hearings. See Death Investigation Systems,
CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL. AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/phlp/
publications/coroner/death.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2019) (noting the various
state death investigation systems).
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B. Apportionment of Liability
Once a firearm death has been reported, the next step is
to assess liability. Because a substantial portion of firearm
deaths
are
suicides
and
unintentional
killings,
administrators can pinpoint the responsible manufacturer
most of the time, as firearms are readily recovered in these
instances.77 Indeed, the CDC reports that roughly 60% of all
homicides caused by firearms are from suicides, and another
2.7% are accidental killings and law enforcement
shootings.78 We now turn to the problem of assigning liability
for deaths that cannot be definitively attributed to a single
manufacturer.
Given the small, but present, error rates in firearm
identification technique discussed above, and even if we both
improve back-end identification and establish rigorous frontend standards, our proposal will sometimes require
apportioning
liability
amongst
several
potentially
responsible manufacturers. We consider here two major
theories of apportioning liability with respect to firearms: (1)
market-share liability and (2) proportional-share liability.
We favor market-share liability because it best incentivizes
manufacturers to adopt safer guns and stronger
identification methods given certain biases in the reporting
of firearms by local law enforcement.

77. See Craig Zwerling et al., The Choice of Weapons in Suicides in Iowa, 83
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1630, 1631 (1993) (noting that in 92.5% of firearm suicides
the type of gun was recorded); CDC DEATH CERTIFICATE, https://www.cdc.gov/
nchs/data/dvs/DEATH11-03final-acc.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2019) (Line 43 of
the death certificate requires type of gun used). Data may not have been as
forthcoming as recently as 30 years ago. See Garen J. Wintemute et al., The
Choice of Weapons in Firearm Suicides, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 824, 824 (1988)
(observing that noting type of gun used in suicides was around 20%).
78. See Gun Violence Statistics, GIFFORDS LAW CTR., https://lawcenter.
giffords.org/facts/gun-violence-statistics/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2019) (citing CTR.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Web-based Injury Statistics Query and
Reporting System (WISQARS), “Fatal Injury Reports,” https://www.cdc.gov/
injury/wisqars).
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1. Market-Share Liability and Proportional-Share
Liability.
Market-share liability is a tort theory that allows
“plaintiffs who [are] harmed by . . . fungible product[s] and
unable to identify the manufacturer who produced the unit
that harmed them [to] sue all manufacturers of the product
and collect from each of them according to their market
share.”79 Contemporary market-share liability theory stems
from classic tort cases concerning pharmaceuticals and
pollutants. In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,80 for example,
women who took diethylstilbestrol (“DES”) in the hopes of
preventing miscarriages were allowed to collect from all five
major manufacturers of the drug because collectively they
produced 90% of the DES on the market.81 The court adopted
the market-share liability theory because “all defendants
produced a drug from an identical formula and the
manufacturer of the DES which caused plaintiff’s injuries
[could not] be identified through no fault of plaintiff.”82
While courts have cited a number of reasons to impose
market-share liability, “the generic nature of the product,” or
fungibility with other products, has been the paramount
consideration.83 Asbestos cases are demonstrative. A New
York federal court,84 for example, “denied application of

79. Logan L. Page, Write This Down: A Model Market-Share Liability Statute,
68 DUKE L.J. 1468, 1468 (2019).
80. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
81. Id. at 937.
82. Id. at 936. See also State v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 126 A.3d 266, 297–98 (N.H.
2015) (affirming the trial court’s application of the market-share liability theory
where “the State faced an impossible burden of proving which of several . . .
gasoline producers caused New Hampshire’s groundwater contamination”).
83. Id. at 291–92; In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab.
Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 348, 376–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“MTBE-containing gasoline
is a fungible product because all brands are interchangeable, and because
different concentrations of MTBE in different batches of gasoline do not affect its
ability to contaminate groundwater.”).
84. 210 East 86th Street Corp. v. Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 125,
127 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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market share liability on the grounds that asbestos was not
fungible in a manner similar to [pharmaceuticals].”85
California, however, worked around the heterogeneity
among brake pads with respect to their asbestos content by
scaling damages accordingly.86
Guns, in contrast to pills or even asbestos, differ widely
in their physical characteristics and uses. They are not
fungible in the strictest sense. What they do share, however,
is a tendency not to remain at the scene of homicides. This
fact led Judge Weinstein to recognize the appropriateness of
market-share liability against handgun manufacturers in
Hamilton v. Accu-Tek.87 Unlike in DES and asbestos cases,
the problem with individual gun-manufacturer liability is
not that “guns are physically indistinguishable or
functionally interchangeable. Instead, guns pose inherent
identification problems because they are uniquely likely to
be unavailable after injury has occurred.”88 As Weinstein put
it:
It is the nature of illegal handgun use that the shooter is likely to
dispose of the gun so as to minimize the chances of being caught.
Depending upon what is available to law enforcement investigators
where the gun is not retrieved, it will be possible only in some
instances, and then to varying degrees, to narrow the field of
possible handgun manufacturers. On much different facts and for
different reasons than those in the DES cases, difficulties in

85. Justine S. Hastings & Michael A. Williams, Market Share Liability:
Lessons from New Hampshire v. Exxon Mobil, 34 J. ENV. L. & LITIG. 219, 239
(2019).
86. Wheeler v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 109, 109–10 (Ct. App.
1992); Hastings & Williams, supra note 85, at 240 (“Given equal market shares,
a defendant that makes pads with 60% asbestos should pay more in damages
than a manufacturer that makes pads with 40% asbestos.”).
87. 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
88. Allen Rostron, Beyond Market Share Liability: A Theory of Proportional
Share Liability for Nonfungible Products, 52 UCLA L. REV. 151, 186 (2004). Note
that Judge Weinstein went further and suggested that, even if a plaintiff could
identify the manufacturer, liability might still be imposed on the entire industry
if the theory of the case was that the “underlying cause of the injuries is the
unchecked growth of the underground handgun market.” Hamilton, 935 F. Supp.
at 1331.
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defendant identification unique to the product and to manufacturer
may arise. The New York Court of Appeals might choose to adopt,
for reasons of public policy, a theory of collective liability. Most
appropriate might be a form of market share liability that provided
for exculpation.89

On certification of this issue in Hamilton, however, the
New York Court of Appeals unanimously rejected this
approach, focusing their analysis on fungibility.90 The court
explained that, “[u]nlike DES, guns are not identical,
fungible products” and that “it is often possible to identify
the caliber and manufacturer of the handgun that caused
injury to a particular plaintiff.”91 Second, the court argued
that market share would not correspond to the amount of
risk created by the manufacturers’ “widely-varied conduct”
in distributing and selling their guns.92
While our statutory proposal is in no way bound to
common law principles, similar considerations bear on
questions of collective liability. To make manufacturers
liable for gun deaths without any regard to their relative
contribution to the problem would run counter to our
primary goal of changing their behavior. But Judge
Weinstein’s rationale and suggestion would not put us in
such a position. Rather, we see three reasonable approaches
to the “missing gun” problem: (1) adopting a functional
definition of fungibility rather than a formalistic one and
using market-share liability as in the DES cases, (2) using a
different model of collective liability—proportional liability,
or (3) employing a variant market-share approach that is
more sensitive to risk generation, as in the brake pad cases.
The first approach seems to us too blunt an instrument.
Notably, Judge Weinstein applied raw market-share only to
handguns. While the case did not call for a broader class of

89. 935 F. Supp. at 1331.
90. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 222, 240–42 (2001).
91. Id. at 240–41.
92. Id. at 241.
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responsible guns from which to measure market share, the
similarity among handguns generally in the risks they create
would have gone some way toward sculpting the signal
generated by compensation. It is important to our proposal,
though, that good manufacturer behavior and positive social
efforts result in diminished responsibility. The possibility of
“exculpation” that Weinstein suggested could be “most
appropriate” points us toward a better option.
If pure market share is the wrong measure, we could
perhaps ignore it altogether. An alternative is to impose
liability for a gun death in proportion to the deaths a
manufacturer’s guns have caused in cases where the
responsible gun has been identified. In this spirit, Allen
Rostron has proposed using ATF gun trace data to apportion
liability.93 He explains that the ATF database “provides
reasonable estimates of the extent to which different types of
guns are used in crimes” and the “representation of a
particular model . . . in the trace database can be
dramatically different from its market share measured by
sales.”94 While the recovery numbers are often similar to the
relative sales figures, discrepancies—even wide ones—do
exist. Higher sales volumes do not always translate into
higher gun recoveries.95 Likewise, guns with lower sales can
account for a disproportionate amount of violent crime.
Consistent with this observation, a Maryland report
analyzing gun sales and recoveries from 1990 to 1999, found
93. See Rostron, supra note 88, at 190 (“Rather than trying to squeeze guns
into a theory that does not fit them, the better approach for plaintiffs in cases
involving unidentifiable guns is to exploit the fact that an immense body of data
provides a better way to allocate liability among gun makers.”).
94. Id. at 192–93 (noting that rifles and shotguns “represent more than one
half of all guns sold” yet “account for less than one quarter of traced guns”).
95. CHRISTOPHER S. KOPER, CRIME GUN RISK FACTORS: BUYER, SELLER,
FIREARM, AND TRANSACTION CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH GUN TRAFFICKING
AND CRIMINAL GUN USE, Report to Nat’l Inst. of Just. 37 (2007) (noting that Colt
accounted for 8.6% of all sales but only 3.5% of recovery. And Smith & Wesson
comprised 17.9% of sales but only 12.4% of recoveries). Note the recovered guns
in this report are not limited solely to homicides or suicides. It also includes:
attempted murder, aggravated assault, and armed robbery.
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that cheaper models “defined as those retailing for $150 or
less” accounted for 6% of sales but accounted for nearly 20%
of recovered guns.96
Using current trace data alone to establish proportional
liability is not without its problems, however.97 We have two
reasons to prefer another option. First, trace data is often
biased and unrepresentative. “Using recovered guns as a
basis for estimating the characteristics of all guns used in
crime is analogous to using arrestees as a basis for
estimating the characteristics of all criminals.”98 “The
process by which guns are selected for tracing . . . tend[s] to
exaggerate the share of guns characterized by putative
trafficking indicators.”99 In sum, Keck and Wang identify
three major biases in trace data: (1) a preference for tracing
newer guns, (2) underrepresentation of in-state origin guns,
and (3) overrepresentation of certain types of guns, such as
assault weapons.100 Applying proportional liability would
skew incentives in the direction of the bias of the trace data.
This would be inconsistent with our goal of more accurately
attributing costs to precise manufacturers and improving
96. Id. at 5–6. Koper’s data further shows that, for example, Davis Industries
accounted for 4.3% of all gun sales for the 1990–1999 period but represented
15.3% of all recoveries. Id. at 37.
97. See id. at 20 (noting that there are biases among police to trace only
particular guns and that guns manufactured before 1968 are essentially
untraceable because there were no laws in effect requiring dealers to keep
records). Additionally, some courts, at least, cite fungibility concerns with even
proportional liability. See, e.g., City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 199902590, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 352 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 2002); District of
Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. Civ.A. 0428-00, 2002 WL 31811717 (D.C.
Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 2002), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 847
A.2d 1127 (D.C. 2004).
98. Phillip J. Cook & Anthony A. Braga, Comprehensive Firearms Tracing:
Strategic and Investigative Uses of New Data on Firearms Markets, 43 ARIZ. L.
REV. 277, 290 (2001).
99. Gary Kleck & Shun-Yung Kevin Wang, The Myth of Big-Time Gun
Trafficking and the Overinterpretation of Gun Tracing Data, 56 UCLA L. REV.
1233, 1271 (2009); see also Collins et al., supra note 40, at 99 (noting that trace
studies yield inconsistent findings and have inherent bias).
100. Kleck & Wang, supra note 99, at 1272–73.
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gun safety across the board.
But even if the data could be acquired in a more
representative way, it is more complicated than necessary.
Where possible, our proposal has opted for simplicity of
administration at every turn. Because generating any signal
at all to the public and to manufacturers concerning the costs
of guns would be a massive improvement, we have
consistently low-balled the assessment and degree of
liability. Precision is not required, only basic fairness. And
so, we would resort to the data that are far easier to collect
and to verify: sales data. Using these simple data could be
made fairer and to carry a better signal of relative risk with
a few modifications.
For this reason, we would instead employ a variant of
market-share-based damages, as was done in the asbestos
brake pad cases. Here is what we have in mind: For each gun
death, there will be an administrative conclusion concerning
the set of potentially responsible guns. The findings of
medical examiners would be afforded near-conclusive weight
in determining this set. Liability would be apportioned by the
relative market share within the set of potentially
responsible guns.
In addition to the obvious distinguishing characteristics
of the evidence, like bullet caliber, the absence of a gun’s
class characteristics, including intentional microstamps,
could remove a manufacturer from this set. We would go
even further and establish that a gun manufactured with
reliable, manufacturer-level microstamping will exclude that
gun from the set of potentially responsible guns even if the
evidence does not exclude the gun as the possible source of
violence.
This collective liability model creates incentives for gun
manufacturers to develop additional class characteristics,
intentionally identifying marks, and safety features. And it
could be taken further yet. We could reduce liability for (or
possibly exclude from liability altogether) manufacturers
that employ additional class characteristics and safety
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features—like smart gun technologies. And for a
manufacturer’s very significant enhancements to safety, we
could even remove from potential market-share liability
guns that have already been manufactured, leaving the
manufacturer liable only for deaths positively determined to
be caused by its guns.
We realize that market-share apportionment theory
generally is the subject of much criticism.101 But the
particular structure we advance here, combined with the fact
that it is only used when a responsible gun cannot be
positively identified, blunts nearly all of them.
2. National Vaccine Act as a Model.
Administrative apportionment of liability is already a
proven concept. The National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program (“VICP”)102 establishes a “no-fault alternative to the
traditional tort system” that “provides compensation to
people found to be injured by certain vaccines.”103 The
program was created, in part, to “achieve optimal prevention
against adverse reactions to vaccines”104 and to compensate
victims of vaccine-related injury or death.105 While our
101. See, e.g., Hamilton, 96 N.Y.2d at 241 (“[A] manufacturer’s share of the
national handgun market does not necessarily correspond to the amount of risk
created by its alleged tortious conduct. No case has applied the market share
theory of liability to such varied conduct and wisely so.”); Timothy D. Lytton, The
Complementary Role in Tort Litigation in Regulating the Gun Industry, in SUING
THE GUN INDUSTRY 250, 259 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005) (“[M]arket share
liability should be applied with caution” because when “[a]pplied to gun
litigation, [it] would eliminate manufacturers’ incentive to keep sales information
and would thereby undercut justification for the doctrine based on the
complementary role of tort law.”).
102. National Vaccine Childhood Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1–34
(2012).
103. About the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, HEALTH RES.
& SERVS. ADM., https://www.hrsa.gov/vaccine-compensation/about/index.html
(last visited Sept. 22, 2019) [hereinafter VICP].
104. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 (2012).
105. Id. § 300aa-10; see also VICP, supra note 103 (noting three objectives
including “establish[ing] and maintain[ing] an accessible and efficient forum for
individuals found to be injured by certain vaccines”).
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proposal has slightly different aims, the VICP provides a
feasible framework from which to administer our program.
When vaccines first came into use, people who
experienced side effects had little recourse to compensation
from manufacturers.106 As tort law and theories of product
liability evolved, victims began suing manufacturers, so
much so that the continued availability of certain vaccines
relied on single manufacturers.107 In response, Congress
enacted the VICP to help “stabilize the legal environment for
manufacturers, [by] allowing them to limit their liability,
better anticipate their legal costs, and reduce barriers to
research into new vaccines.”
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(“DHHS”) operates the VICP. Each covered vaccine dose is
taxed $0.75, which is collected from vaccine manufacturers
by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.108 Manufacturers
pay this excise tax based on the number of doses sold, and so
liability is apportioned not based on actual harm imposed but
on production and sales.109 Vaccine tax funds are deposited
into an interest-bearing trust account, similar to our
proposed Gun Safety Fund.110

106. Vaccine Injury Compensation Programs, HISTORY OF VACCINES,
https://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/articles/vaccine-injury-compensationprograms (last visited Sept. 22, 2019).
107. Id. (“[O]nly one U.S. company still manufactured the DPT vaccine . . . .”).
108. National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, HEALTH RES. & SERVS.
ADM., https://www.in.gov/isdh/files/VICP.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2019).
Vaccines administered prior to the start of tax collection in 1988 were
compensated by general tax monies allocated by Congress. Id.
109. See Pam Belluck & Reed Abelson, Vaccine Injury Claims Are Few and Far
Between, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/
health/vaccine-injury-claims.html; see also Vaccines, INTERNAL REV. SERV.,
https://taxmap.irs.gov/taxmap2014/pubs/p510-039.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2019)
(“The tax is $.75 per dose of each taxable vaccine. The tax per dose on a vaccine
that contains more than one taxable vaccine is $.75 times the number of taxable
vaccines.”). Note the tax is collected when the doses are sold, but if used before
being sold they are also taxable. Id.
110. See August 2019 Report, Vaccine Injury Trust Fund, ftp://ftp.publicdebt
.treas.gov/dfi/tfmb/dfivi0819.pdf 2–3 (last visited Oct. 5, 2019).
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C. Rate-setting
Our proposal requires a number of figures to be set to
determine liabilities imposed and subsidies granted. In
particular, there must be a fixed liability per gun death, a
suicide discount rate, and a subsidy rate. We propose that
the legislation direct the CDC to adopt each of these rates by
ordinary notice-and-comment rulemaking, with the
following further directives.
1. Administrative Rate-setting Process
Foremost among the rates set by the CDC would be the
fee paid by a gun manufacturer for a death from one of its
guns. Arriving at a perfectly “accurate” rate is not crucial.
Our goal is to create a directed signal, one that we will
attenuate massively with subsidies. We have suggested $6
million as a start, which finds support in current
administrative practice. For example, the EPA publishes a
mortality risk valuation to produce a measurement called
the “value of statistical life” (“VSL”).111 Using cost-benefit
analysis, the EPA calculated a VSL of $7.4 million per person
in 2006, and in 2016 increased it to $10 million, all within
about 20% of figures used by other agencies.112 Richard
Thaler has argued such figures are too high and has
calculated a VSL at $1.5 million.113 While Thaler’s $1.5
million and the EPA’s $10 million VSL differ by nearly an
order of magnitude, any figure between them would serve the
public purposes of our program. In fact, adopting a lower rate
than the $6 million we suggest would not affect the postsubsidy fees paid by gun manufacturers until far into the

111. See ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/environmentaleconomics/mortality-risk-valuation (last visited May 26, 2019).
112. Dave Merrill, No One Values Your Life More Than the Federal
Government, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/
2017-value-of-life/. The Department of Agriculture calculates a VSL of $8.9
million and the Food and Drug Administration calculates a figure of $9.5 million.
Id.
113. Id.
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future, when the rate of subsidy has declined substantially.
An additional reason to think that $6 million is
conservative, in the case of this program, is that this figure
is a proxy for social harm but excludes all social costs but
death. If liability to the Gun Safety Fund included the costs
of the roughly 100,000 nonfatal gun injuries each year,114 the
total fees charged pre-subsidy would be high enough so that
even aberrantly low VSLs used to price lives lost would result
in amounts comparable to what we propose here.
2. Suicide Discounting
Our proposal discounts the amount of liability for
suicides. Again, this is not because lives lost to suicide are
any less valuable but, rather, because a significant portion of
suicides by gun would occur by other methods if guns were
unavailable. The social cost of guns includes only those gun
suicides that would not have been completed by another
method. For this reason, our proposal discounts the payment
to the liability fund to reflect only the excess suicides caused
by guns.115 The empirical determination and resulting
discount rate would be set using the same CDC
administrative process that sets the per death liability
figure.116
Extending the principle of simplicity that animates
much of our proposal, one might be tempted not to include
suicides at all, especially given that they are voluntary and
that it seems intuitive that substitute methods could always
be used. 117 This would be a mistake. In 2017, fully half of all

114. See WISQARS, supra note 21.
115. Adjusting for excess deaths for events such as war is common practice
when calculating mortality rates. See, e.g., Michael Spagat & Stijn van Weezel,
Half a Million Excess Deaths in Iraq War: Terms and Conditions May Apply, RES.
& POL., Oct.–Dec. 2017, at 1–2.
116. See supra Section III.C.1.
117. By voluntary, we mean only that suicide is an action the victim inflicts on
themselves, unlike homicides. We realize suicide victims often face mental health
and other serious life issues.

2020]

THE GUN SUBSIDY

1157

suicides were by gun.118 And the evidence is that many of
these deaths would not have occurred but for the availability
of guns.119 Guns are not just a method but a necessary, causal
fact of many suicides.
Research reveals how our intuitions about suicide might
fail. First, suicides are generally the result of impulsive
action—not long-planned deeds.120 “A startling 24 percent” of
suicide survivors said the time between making the decision
to commit suicide and making the attempt was less than five
minutes.121 Once the trigger is pulled victims cannot change
their minds or be lucky enough not to succeed, whereas many
other methods, such as drugs, are more forgiving.122 Indeed,
nine out of ten suicide survivors do not later die by suicide.123
We do not know whether either changes in gun design or
new regulations could decrease the attractiveness, utility, or
availability of guns for suicide.124 Indeed, that very epistemic
118. See Suicide Statistics, AM. FOUND. FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION,
https://afsp.org/about-suicide/suicide-statistics/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019)
(noting firearms accounted for 50.6% of all suicides, followed by suffocation,
poisoning, and other methods).
119. See Miller et al., supra note 20, at 36–40 (finding gun availability is
associated with excess suicide death and that suicide rates are twice as high in
high-gun ownership states than in low-gun ownership states).
120. Madeline Drexler, Guns & Suicide: The Hidden Toll, HARV. PUB. HEALTH
(2016), https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/magazine/magazine_article/guns-suicide/
(“Perhaps the biggest fallacy is that suicides are typically long-planned deeds. . . .
[E]mpirical evidence suggests that [victims] act in a moment of brief but
heightened vulnerability.”).
121. Id.
122. See Matthew Miller et al., Firearms and Suicide in the United States: Is
Risk Independent of Underlying Suicidal Behavior?, 178 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY
946, 951 (2013) (noting that 90% of all suicide attempts by gun are fatal but only
3% of attempts by drugs or cutting are fatal); see also Matthew J. Spittal et al.,
Declines in the Lethality of Suicide Attempts Explain the Decline in Suicide
Deaths in Australia, 7 PLOS ONE 1, 3 (2012) (collecting Australian suicide data
from 1994 to 2007 in which the lethality rates by method were: guns (74%),
hanging (59%), motor vehicle exhaust (45%), and poisoning (6%)).
123. Drexler, supra note 120.
124. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Gun Violence, Mental Illness, And
Laws That Prohibit Gun Possession: Evidence from Two Florida Counties, 35
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problem is the impetus to reveal the price paid in lost lives.
We do know that more guns lead to more deaths by suicide.
As some researchers have noted: “If even 1 in 10 of the
approximately 22,000 persons who attempted suicide with
firearms in 2010 (the 19,932 who died and the approximately
2,000 who survived) substituted drugs or cutting, there
would have been approximately 1,900 fewer suicide
deaths.”125 Pricing the portion of suicides guns cause will
create uniform interest and effort in finding ways to achieve
even modest mortality reductions, potentially saving
thousands of lives.
3. The Gun Subsidy
Perhaps the most counterintuitive part of our proposal is
the massive subsidy for gun manufacturers it creates: the
Gun Subsidy. Of course, the point is that we are already
paying this subsidy, but its amount is hidden and borne
entirely by victims of gun violence. Shifting these costs to
gun manufacturers would largely eliminate a massive
externality of their chosen production. But doing so would
make the production of guns for private markets
impossible.126
For the purposes of this Article, we assume that would
be a step too far under the Supreme Court’s decision in
District of Columbia v. Heller.127 That case established an
individual right to use and keep guns for defensive purposes,
such as self-defense in one’s home.128 The Court there took
HEALTH AFF. 1067, 1071–72 (2016) (finding no significant association between
suicide risk and legal disqualification, owing to prior mental health adjudication,
from gun possession under a Florida law).
125. Miller et al., supra note 122, at 951.
126. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
127. 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
128. Id. at 595 (“There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and
history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and
bear arms.”); id. at 616 (“It was plainly the understanding in the post-Civil War
Congress that the Second Amendment protected an individual right to use arms
for self-defense.”).
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pains to note that the right it found had limits:
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons
and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
arms.129

The Court further wrote that the right did not extend to
“dangerous and unusual weapons,”130 suggesting, at least
hypothetically, that “weapons that are most useful in
military service—M-16 rifles and the like—may be
banned.”131
Nothing in the Court’s opinion would bar states or the
federal government from taxing weapons like ordinary
products, banning particularly dangerous guns, or imposing
liability so long as the practical ability to keep a gun for
defensive purposes is preserved.132 Making the industry pay
its costs is not possible, but we propose they should
nonetheless contribute to paying the social costs they create.
To accomplish this, we propose that a portion of each
liability payment to the Gun Safety Fund be sent back to the
manufacturers as an explicit subsidy. This would not be a
wholesale refund, and certain stipulations would apply to
receive the subsidy. The Gun Subsidy would be administered
by the CDC, and manufacturers would be required to apply

129. Id. at 626–27.
130. Id. at 627.
131. Id.
132. Even if the Court identifies some form of a “right to manufacture” SecondAmendment-eligible guns, a virtue of the Gun Subsidy program is that it
preserves manufacturing necessary for the core individual right the Court found
in Heller. Cody Jacobs has reasoned that “the right to sell and manufacture
firearms must be part of the core of the Second Amendment right, since it would
be impossible for citizens to keep arms for self-defense in the home without the
ability to purchase firearms.” Cody Jacobs, The Second Amendment & Private
Law, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 945, 989 (2017). Whatever difficulties such a derivative
right might pose to the application to guns of a state’s products liability laws, our
administrative proposal builds in a solution.
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on an annual basis to receive subsidy funds. To be certified
to do so, manufacturers would need to show compliance with
the test firing and casings shipment requirements. Increased
subsidies, grants, and exclusions from liability for older guns
could be provided to manufacturers who choose to adopt gun
safety technologies, such as microstamping, bullet buttons,
and biometric and RFID technologies or who engage in
valuable safety-related research and development.133
The Gun Subsidy then achieves two goals: (1) to keep
firearm manufacturers as a whole from going out of business,
averting a Second Amendment problem, and (2) to shift
resources to manufacturers who seek to solve the gun
violence problem rather than those who avoid responsibility.
Indeed, the large amount of each subsidy leaves ample room
for policy nudges that can further direct manufacturers
toward publicly beneficial technologies, marketing, and
public participation.
4. Hearings and Challenges
A significant virtue of our proposal is that it channels
litigation through an administrative process working with
relatively fixed figures and narrow issues. Manufacturers
and the public will have the full panoply of rights under the
APA to challenge the CDC’s rulemaking,134 rate setting,135
and adjudications.136 But these challenges would by design
133. These subsidies would be granted in addition to removal from the marketshare liability pool. See supra Section III.B.1. This also assumes Congress or state
governments do not elect to make these requirements mandatory. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 31910(b)(7)(A) (West 2012).
134. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (allowing for public comment on rules).
135. The APA also defines the approval or prescription of rates as a rule, which
would be challengeable during the notice-and-comment period. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)
(2012).
136. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2012) (detailing the procedures for adjudication). And
the regulations themselves could provide for contests over rates to mirror those
of bid protests. See generally DAVID H. CARPENTER & MOSHE SCHWARTZ, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R45080, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT BID PROTESTS: ANALYSIS OF
LEGAL PROCESSES AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (2018) (outlining the bid protest
process). Such protests feature efficient timelines for adjudication. For example,
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be limited in scope and expense, especially when viewed in
light of two alternatives: the private tort system and
gunmaker immunity. The first unleashes all the power and
problems of the private market for tort representation, class
actions, and jury awards. It is notoriously unpredictable and
costly.137 While the second option, gunmaker immunity, is
more predictable, it is not necessarily cheaper, as leaving
losses on victims is both morally condemnable and a classic
moral hazard.138
Full exposure of manufacturers to state tort law, through
repeal of the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms
Act (“PLCAA”),139 could indeed change manufacturer
behavior, both in commerce and in politics, in ways similar
to those that animate the Gun Liability Fund proposal. We
are concerned, though, that meaningful repeal is politically
fraught and that the costs and benefits of private litigation
may not be as productive as the swifter, surer signal we
propose.140 For example, private litigation against firearms
manufacturers—in a PLCAA-free world—would likely
mirror other mass tort cases, which are often rife with delays
and backroom settlements that benefit everyone but
plaintiffs.141 Our primary goal of changing the political
agencies typically must resolve bid protests within 35 days after one has been
filed. 48 C.F.R. § 33.103(g) (2019).
137. See infra note 141.
138. See Allen Rostron, It’s Time to Repeal the Gun Industry’s Exceptional
Legal Immunity, THE CONVERSATION (Dec. 9, 2015, 6:09 AM),
https://theconversation.com/its-time-to-repeal-the-gun-industrys-exceptionallegal-immunity-51950 (describing California’s regret in “bestowing special
immunity on gunmakers” when a gunman killed eight people using “a pair of
TEC-9 assault pistols, weapons with a notorious reputation for being designed
and marketed in ways that appealed to criminals”).
139. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2012).
140. See Lytton, supra note 101, at 251 (“[T]ort claims against gun
manufacturers can complement legislative efforts to regulate the firearms
industry . . . [but] the mass tort features of some of the more recent cases threaten
to undermine the legitimacy of the whole enterprise.”).
141. See generally ELIZABETH C. BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS: BACKROOM
BARGAINING IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 154–57 (2019) (describing systemic
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economy surrounding the gun crisis is best served by liability
that follows a gun death with a degree of certainty and
regularity approaching taxation, rather than with lengthy
rounds of bargaining, jockeying for representation, and
controversial judgments concerning legal responsibility and
traditional tort principles.
Moreover, if the tort system were able to extract
compensation for even a portion of the deaths owing to guns,
the industry would not survive.142 Ordinarily that would be
a welcome result, as industries that are more costly than
beneficial generally should not exist. Many indeed would
welcome that result in this case. But the very fact that nonsurvival is a likely consequence of even partial exposure to
tort law makes non-sporadic and systematic use of tort an
unlikely solution in the current political climate.
Our administrative system, in contrast, would be swifter
and surer, without giving rise to existential political battles.
Once a gun death is either reported to the CDC or discovered
by the CDC, the CDC will gather evidence, including reports
from cooperating coroners, medical examiners, and law
enforcement. If the evidence does not support a conclusion
that the shooting was in self-defense or a valid act of law
enforcement, it will then determine the set of potentially
responsible guns and the corresponding set of potentially
responsible manufacturers. The CDC will send those
manufacturers notices of liability, where the portion of the
per-death liability they bear depends on the relative market
share of their guns that fall within the set. The notice shall
indicate the total amount of liability, the amount that will be
subsidized by the Gun Subsidy, and the total amount due
after subsidy.
Manufacturers may choose to contest the CDC’s
determination or simply to pay. In the former case, there are
issues in mass tort cases including delays in payable claims, confusion over
denied claims, and lack of “meaningful access to justice”).
142. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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various options for adjudication, and we have no firm view of
which would be best. The statute could provide that the CDC
would hold a formal adjudication, initially before an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Arbitration or mediation
could also prove to be viable here, because they would reduce
expenses to all parties.143 The General Accountability Office
(“GAO”) already has experience advising parties on likely
outcomes for other types of claims, which has the effect of
promoting settlement.144
The statute could also establish multiple fora to
challenge enforcement decisions, similar to the procedures
used to resolve bid protests.145 Decisions could first be
challenged directly in the CDC or in the GAO. The CDC
would be required to resolve these challenges within 35 days
of receipt.146 Manufacturers would then have ten days to file
a challenge with the GAO, which would then review the
CDC’s decision within 100 days.147 The decisions of the
Agency and of the GAO, as with decisions concerning bid
protests, would not be binding. Therefore, manufacturers
dissatisfied with a GAO decision could file suit in the Court
of Federal Claims (“COFC”) which would render a legally
binding decision (at least in terms of findings of fact),
reviewable by an Article III court.148 Unlike the bid protest

143. The Government Accountability Office, for instance, offers alternative
dispute resolution for bid protests in contract disputes. The Department of the
Navy reports that ADR resulted in a $3 million savings for fiscal years 2001–04
due to avoiding costs for travel, depositions, experts, and discovery. See
ACQUISITION ADR IN THE DON, https://www.secnav.navy.mil/ADR/Pages/
acquisitionadr.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2019).
144. Id.
145. See generally CARPENTER & SCHWARTZ, supra note 136 (outlining the bid
protest process).
146. 48 C.F.R. § 33.103(g) (1997).
147. Id. § 33.104(c), (f).
148. Cases from the COFC would be reviewed by the Federal Circuit just like
VICP claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12f (2000). Note that COFC is an Article I
court and must still maintain sufficient adjunct status to Article III courts for
constitutional reasons. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478
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process, we would suggest that when filing a challenge with
the COFC, manufacturers would be required to pay a filing
fee to cover court costs. Additionally, if the manufacturer
loses, it would compensate the CDC and the GAO for the time
and resources expended in making their decisions.149
We take no strong view on the best provision for
enforcement procedures. The key observation is that the
Agency’s role will be circumscribed and predictable. It will
operate under ordinary rulemaking and adjudication
procedures. And the potential set of contested issues will be
small.
D. The Gun Safety Fund
By far the most important use of the monies paid into the
Gun Safety Fund is the fact that they are publicly lost to the
manufacturers. It is the social-good aligning function of the
Fund that justifies its existence. Any uses of the Fund
resources that do not themselves create bad consequences,
e.g. rent-seekers, would serve that goal. That said, an
opportunity would exist to direct money toward the
amelioration of the very social losses that occasion
manufacturers’ payments.
Using funds collected from manufacturers of harmful
products is not uncharted territory. In fact, three such funds
exist that could serve as models for the use of the gun fund.
As discussed in Section III.A., one good use of the fund would
be to cover the costs of implementing the reporting system.
This portion of the fund could be allocated like the EPA
Superfund.150 The EPA Superfund was established to
reimburse the government for the clean-up of contamination
and oil spills by the chemical and petroleum industries.
Likewise, the Gun Safety Fund could reimburse law
U.S. 833, 834–35 (1986).
149. This would operate similar to appeals from the Patent Trial and
Trademark Appeal Board. 35 U.S.C. § 145 (2012).
150. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9601–9675 (2018).
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enforcement, medical examiners, and other agencies that
participate in investigating shootings and participating with
the CDC in establishing responsible guns. It could also cover
procurement costs of ballistic data imaging equipment and
pay for ALJs or special masters during adjudication. The
Gun Safety Fund and Gun Subsidy will be self-funding.
Second, the Gun Safety Fund could, in some
circumstances, compensate victims of gun violence. This
could work similarly to the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program established under the National
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (“Vaccine Act”).151 Under the
Vaccine Act, claimants can file petitions for compensation for
injuries and death caused from vaccines to the Court of
Federal Claims.152 The Vaccine Act sets monetary caps and
uses an injury table.153 The Gun Safety Fund would not fully
compensate victims in the manner of a wrongful death suit
or even the Vaccine Act, but for families affected by gun
violence it could assist with lost income and funeral
expenses.154 There exist models in some states, such as
Florida, Iowa, and New York, for such compensation
plans.155
Another possibility is to pass on a portion of the liability

151. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-34(a)-(b) (2000).
152. Id. § 300aa-11(a)(1).
153. See Vaccine Injury Table, 42 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2019) (listing vaccines,
illnesses, and time periods for first symptom or manifestation onset after vaccine
administration); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(b) (2000) (setting the maximum
compensation rate at $30,000 for vaccines administered before Oct. 1, 1988).
154. See Michelle Singletary, The Enormous Economic Cost of Gun Violence,
WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2018, 7:26 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/getthere/wp/2018/02/22/the-enormous-economic-cost-of-gun-violence/?utm_term=.
155cf47c8702 (“Researchers conservatively estimate that gun violence costs the
American economy . . . $8.6 billion in direct expenses such as for emergency and
medical care.”).
155. See generally Elizabeth Van Brocklin, Gunshot Survivors May be Eligible
for Crime Victim Compensation. Here’s Everything You Need to Know to Apply,
THE TRACE (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.thetrace.org/2018/04/gunshot-survivorscrime-victims-compensation-how-to/.
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payments to the states and allow them to decide how to
spend the money. As with tobacco settlement proceeds,
states could then direct the money to state and local
programs.156 Many states decided to use their tobacco money
to fund smoking-cessation programs and to provide health
care. Somewhat perversely, North Carolina and South
Carolina “used some of their funds to support tobacco
farmers and producers.”157 We would recommend restricting
the use of funds to combatting or compensating for the harms
caused by guns, especially in light of the fact that gun
manufacturers would already be receiving a subsidy as
described above.

156. See 15 Years Later, Where Did All the Cigarette Money Go?, NPR (Oct. 13,
2013, 5:52 PM), https://www.npr.org/2013/10/13/233449505/15-years-laterwhere-did-all-the-cigarette-money-go.
157. Clyde Hughes, 20 Years After Settlement, Billion in Anti-Tobacco Funds
Spent Elsewhere, UPI (Dec. 3, 2018, 2:45 AM), https://www.upi.com/20-yearsafter-settlement-billions-in-anti-tobacco-funds-spentelsewhere/8971543517818/.
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CONCLUSION
A civilization cannot long exist that fails to respond
deliberatively to urgent social problems. It is a damning
indictment of us, and a challenge to our existence as a great
democracy, that we did not respond to the mass-murder of
twenty first-grade students and six staff members at an
elementary school. And the murders have continued.
Democracy is hard work, and ours must find a way to ensure
that social problems are perceived, that deliberation on them
is had, and that efforts to solve them are implemented. The
process of perceiving, considering, and responding, after all,
is what distinguishes the actions of an intelligent being from
the mechanics of a clod of earth.
The proposal here is optimistic. It posits that we can be
better collectively if only our decision-making is organized in
such a way that we engage with the proper facts and stop
treating others as valueless. Perhaps our worst instincts
resist the moderating influence of political structures
engineered to bring out our best. But it is worth trying to
become better.

